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NAFTA, GATT, AND THE CURRENT FREE
TRADE SYSTEM: A DANGEROUS DOUBLE
STANDARD FOR WORKERS' RIGHTS
CHANTELL TAYLOR'
The single, clearest, most direct result of economic globalization to date
is a massive global transfer of economic and political power away from
national governments and into the hands of global corporations and the
trade bureaucracies they helped create. This transfer of power is pro-
ducing dire consequences for the environment, human rights, social
welfare, agriculture, food safety, workers' rights, national sovereignty,
and democracy itself.1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The 1999 Seattle Round and WTO's Future
From November 30th through December 3"d 1999, the 135 member
States of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 2 were scheduled to con-
vene for a round of negotiations in Seattle, Washington "to review the
global trading system and ensure its dynamism and responsiveness in
the years ahead. 8 The Seattle Round is ninth in a series of "negotiating
rounds," including the Uruguay Round of 1986-94 that resulted in the
official birth of the WTO.4 Each round has built off of the last and each
has brought in more member countries to negotiate rules for liberalized
J.D. candidate 2001, University of Denver, College of Law.
1. The International Forum on Globalization is a research and educational institu-
tion comprised of 60 researchers, scholars, activists, and economists from 20 countries.
DEBI BARKER & JERRY MANDER, INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT 1 (International Forum on Glob-
alization, Oct. 1999) [hereinafter INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT].
Editor's Comment: This article has not been revised since spring 1999.
2. AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, adopted 14 Apr.
1994, entered into force, Jan. 1, 1995, reprinted in 33 I.L.M 1125 (1994)[hereinafter WTO
AGREEMENT]. In the words of the WTO itself: "... the World Trade Organization (WTO)
is the only international organization dealing with the global rules of trade between na-
tions. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely
as possible." See <http://www.wto.org/wto/about/about.htm> (visited Dec. 22, 1999). The
WTO currently has 135 members, including both industrial and developing nations.
3. World Trade Organization, Seattle: What's At Stake 1 (1999) [hereinafter What's
at Stake].
4. WTO AGREEMENT, supra note 2.
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trade.5 The Seattle Round was considered the most significant meeting
of the members since the 1994 establishment of the WTO because the
members intended to map out the WTO's work agenda for the months
and years ahead.6 It was this part of the agenda that roused contro-
versy between the government bureaucrats and citizen action groups,
whose visions for the future of the WTO were in direct conflict.
To many, and particularly to organized labor, the Seattle Round
constituted a rare opportunity to capture the attention of global bu-
reaucrats who for years have been crafting international trade rules
without democratic participation, transparency or accountability. As
early as November 26, 1999, fair trade' activists from all over the world
began sprinkling into Seattle homes, hotels and streets - just the be-
ginning of an ultimate activist monsoon. It was earlier predicted that
fair trade demonstrators would outnumber the bureaucrats of the WTO
by the thousands, and some international trade bureaucrats and law-
yers in Washington, D.C. anticipated "real blood and guts."8 Their pre-
dictions came true . . . with a vengeance.
The controversy between organized labor and the trade bureaucrats
of the WTO, while multifaceted, can be plainly stated: the WTO openly
declares that labor is not on the agenda and labor thinks it ought to be.
According to the WTO, "there is no work on the subject [of labor] in the
WTO, and it would be wrong to assume that it is a subject that 'lies
ahead."'9  Rather than integrate labor standards directly into WTO
rules and agreements, WTO members defer the issue to the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO): "The International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal with these standards
and we affirm our support of its work in promoting them."10 Conversely,
the AFL-CIO, America's largest labor union and an avid opponent of
the existing WTO, argues:
5. WHAT'S AT STAKE, supra note 3, 10-12 (1999); See also discussion infra note 52.
6. Id. at 15 (1999).
7. The term "fair trade" is often used by opponents of "free trade" agreements such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the World Trade Organization.
8. Helene Cooper, Will Human Chains and Zapatistas Greet the WTO in Seattle?
Globalization Foes Plan to Hit November Trade Event; 'Make Love, Not Profit,' WALL ST.
J., July 16, 1999. [hereinafter Make Love, Not Profit].
9. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADING INTO THE FUTURE 60 (2d ed.
1998)[hereinafter TRADING INTO THE FUTURE].
10. Id. at 61; see also infra notes 134-138 for further discussion of the ILO.
11. Add definition and explanation of AFL-CIO.
12. See generally AFL-CIO, WORKERS' RIGHTS AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
AND IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 5 (Publication No. 99155-06-0-5)[hereinafter WORKERS'
RIGHTS](Unlike some organizations that propose the WTO be completely dismantled, the
AFL-CIO takes a reformist approach: calling for the WTO to, among other things, estab-
lish a working group on workers' rights, to fix current trade agreements like the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and to incorporate enforceable labor stan-
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WTO failure to enforce minimum labor standards
results in ongoing exploitation of workers in the global
market... The WTO enforces intellectual property
rights, market access and government regulation of in-
vestment - and there is no reason why it also cannot en-
force basic minimum standards for the humane and de-
cent treatment of workers. 3
B. Summary
This article compares the corporate rights embodied in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the GATT/WTO with
workers' rights embodied in the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation (NAALC) and the International Labor Organization (ILO),
suggesting that corporations enjoy far greater protection in the global
marketplace than workers. This article further argues that unless the
system is reformed, workers will continue to be exploited at the expense
of corporate profits. By contrasting the NAFTA and the GATT/WTO en-
forcement mechanisms for commercial rights versus labor rights, this
article attempts to expose how the current free trade paradigm proce-
durally and substantively promotes a double standard. These inequi-
ties reflect a fundamental flaw perpetuated in international trade policy
today - that international commercial interests can somehow be di-
vorced from the very labor market that fuels globalization.
Section two of this article presents a general background of the
NAFTA and the GATT/WTO, including discussion from both sides of the
debate and current efforts to clone the agreements in new trade ac-
cords. Section three compares the NAFTA's rights for corporations with
the NAALC's rights for labor, noting two specific cases brought by cor-
porations under the NAFTA dispute settlement provisions. Similarly,
section four compares the GATT/WTO rules governing corporate rights
with the ILO principles addressing labor standards. Section five pre-
sents conflicting progress reports in the years since NAFTA and
GATT/WTO took effect. Finally, this article concludes with recommen-
dations and alternatives to reshape the current trade policy.
II. NAFTA, GATT/WTO, AND THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN
Two major congressional votes in the early 1990's continue to
shape the direction of international trade policy today - the 1993 ap-
proval of NAFTA and the 1994 approval of the GATT and the WTO."
dards into all new trade agreements).
13. Id.
14. DAVID J. SAARI, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND SOVEREIGN NATIONS: COLLISION OR
2000 403
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A. NAFTA
1. Background
Although Ronald Reagan was the first U.S. President to propose a
trilateral free trade pact between Canada, the United States and Mex-
ico, no one took the notion seriously until the Bush Administration
picked up the idea in 1991." At the time, Mexican President Carlos
Salinas de Gartari had undertaken major steps to revitalize Mexico's
economy, including "the pursuit of a free trade pact with Washington."1"
On February 5, 1991, after the Salinas and Bush Administrations pri-
vately affirmed mutual interest, President Bush officially announced to
Congress his commitment to negotiate a North American Free Trade
Agreement, calling NAFTA "the first step toward a hemispheric com-
mon market.""
Since its inception, the heart of the NAFTA has been to open up
markets between Canada, Mexico and the United States.' 8 Some of
NAFTA's key provisions include:
Elimination of tariffs on North American industrial products within 10
years of implementation;
Elimination of non-tariff barriers and other trade distorting restric-
tions, such as import licenses, local content, local production, and ex-
port performance requirements;
COOPERATION? 103 (Quorum Books 1999) (the author asserts that the beneficiaries of the
NAFTA and GATT/WTO trading system consist of CEOs from Fortune 500 global corpora-
tions and World Bank and International Monetary Fund officials, while the non-
beneficiaries consist of the "weaker public voice" and "downsized industrial employees.")
[hereinafter SAARI.]
15. WILLIAM A. ORME, JR., UNDERSTANDING NAFTA 34 (University of Texas Press
1996) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING NAFTA].
16. Id. at 32.
17. Id. at 33-4.
18. North American Free Trade Agreement, signed 1993, Canada, Mexico, United
States, available at <http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp>(visited Dec. 4,
2000 [hereinafter NAFTA](The North American Free Trade Agreement officially entered
into force in 1994 and opened the borders for free trade between Mexico, the United
States and Canada. The principle objectives of NAFTA are defined in the first chapter of
its text: fundamental principles of national treatment, most-favored-nation (MFN) treat-
ment, and transparency; a commitment to facilitate the transboundary movement of
goods and services; and a commitment to provide adequate and effective protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights) see NAFTA, art. 102; see also NAFTA Key
Provisions <http://www.mac.doc.gov/nafta/300l.htm>(visited Feb. 26, 2000)[hereinafter
NAFTA Key Provisions].
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Elimination of investment conditions, such as technology transfers, use
of domestic goods or services, set export levels or percentages, and lim-
its on percentage of imports relative to exports;
Guarantees that investors be treated the same as domestic investors
(national treatment);
Guarantees to investors the right to fair compensation in the event of
expropriation, the right to dispute settlement and monetary damages
(legal standing), and the right to repatriate profits and capital (capital
mobility);
Expansive protection of intellectual property rights; and
Access to government procurement.' 9
2. Proponents of NAFTA and Their Promise to Labor
Congress had not considered the notion of incorporating core labor
standards during NAFTA negotiations with Mexico and Canada, rather,
their focus was strictly commercial. 0 Labor issues became a central
part of the debate when Bill Clinton made a 1992 campaign pledge to
complete the NAFTA negotiations - but with added protections for la-
bor, the environment and other social issues.2'
Initially, Clinton was pushing for a NAFTA virtually identical to
the Reagan-Bush proposals already on the table. It was not until mas-
sive opposition erupted from organized labor and the environmental
community, both important constituents to Clinton's campaign, that he
pledged to include side agreements on the issues. 22 This strategy man-
aged to satisfy the business lobby by keeping labor issues out of the
body of the agreement, while appeasing labor groups by not wholly ig-
noring labor standards.23 Clinton promised that the proposed labor side
agreement would include "strong resolution mechanisms and effective
remedies,"2'4 and a team of Clinton administration economists projected
19. Id.
20. CENTER FOR COMMERCIAL LAW STUDIES, NAFTA AND BEYOND, 450 (Joseph Norton
and Thomas L. Bloodworth, eds.) (1995)[hereinafter NAFTA AND BEYOND].
21. See discussion infra note 177.
22. Jerome Levinson, Certifying International Worker Rights: A Practical Alternative,
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE BRIEFING PAPER, at 2 (May 1999)[hereinafter Levinson].
23. Id.
24. Labor, Business, Agriculture, and Environmental Issues Relating to NAFTA:
Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, 103 Cong. 169 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hear-
ing] (preliminary Analysis by the AFL-CIO).
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figures of 200,000 new jobs for Americans in the first two years of
NAFTA alone. 5
Other proponents of NAFTA made dramatic projections that U.S.
export increases to Mexico would create thousands of new, high-paying
jobs for Americans. In 1993, Robert B. Reich, Secretary of the U.S. De-
partment of Labor, testified before the U.S. Senate:
In addition to generating more jobs in the United States, NAFTA will
lead to better jobs. Jobs created by expanded trade typically are the
sorts of higher wage, higher skilled jobs in which the future of the
American work force depends. Missing the boat on NAFTA, we will
26prevent us from reaping these potential gains.
Senator Lloyd Bentsen also testified to the U.S. Senate that:
Now 700,000 Americans depend on trade with Mexico for their jobs.
And things are going to get even better with NAFTA. We calculate that
we'll pick up 200,000 more jobs in the next two years alone, and jobs re-
lated to trade with Mexico pay about 12 percent better than aver-
age.. .This agreement is clearly good for America, and it's clearly good
21for American workers. We're getting a deal here.
To ensure that the NAFTA gain much needed approval in the
House, the Clinton administration sought assistance from business
leaders. In an effort to dispel some of the widespread concern that
NAFTA would encourage U.S.-based companies to relocate in Mexico
where labor and other standards were lax, Clinton urged major compa-
nies to formally pledge that they would not relocate their plants if
NAFTA were approved. 8 U.S. companies balked at the idea of being
bound to such a pledge and ultimately refused to sign. 9
The business leaders did, eventually, come to the rescue because
they were committed to one thing: passage of a NAFTA without labor or
environmental obligations at any cost. To ensure that this goal be met,
a coalition of 2,700 companies, including most of the Fortune 500,
launched a massive campaign called USA*NAFTA USA*NAFTA in-
undated the American public with radio, television, and news paper ads
attempting to ease suspicion about NAFTA benefiting special-interests
25. NAFrA AND BEYOND, supra note 20, at 453.
26. 1993 Hearing, supra note 24 at 56-57 (statement by Robert B. Reich, Secretary of
the U.S. Dept. of Labor).
27. Id. at 25-7 (statement of Hon. Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of the Treas).
28. Asra Q. Nomani, Clinton Urges Firms to Keep Jobs in U.S., WALL ST. J. Nov. 11,
1993.
29. Id.
30. Businessmen for NAFTA, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1993.
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at the expense of American workers.3'
3. NAFTA's Labor Opponents: Promises Not Enough
Opponents of NAFTA argued that even with the labor side agree-
ment, the pact failed to adequately protect labor rights. 12 They argued
that while private corporations are entitled to enforceable rules protect-
ing their assets, workers are denied enforcement rules to protect their
livelihoods. 3
Notwithstanding Clinton's strategy to gain NAFTA approval, the
NAALC labor side agreement was not enough to squelch the opposition
of organized labor.34 Labor unions predicted that massive job loss and
wage stagnation would result in part from U.S. based companies relo-
cating south of the border to capitalize on cheaper markets and lax la-
bor laws. 31 In addition, labor advocates predicted that Mexico's already
poor enforcement of labor laws would worsen and thus further encour-
age a southbound exodus.36 A preliminary analysis of the NAFTA by
the AFL-CIO stated:
The AFL-CIO believes that the [NAFTA] ... would be ruinous to the
U.S. economy, resulting in the loss of hundreds of thousands of Ameri-
can jobs and a general decline in wages. One of the agreements' pri-
mary - though far from only - flaws is its complete failure to promote
the upward harmonization of living standards by linking market access
with the enforcement of worker rights and labor standards.., the
Clinton campaign promised to solve the problem by negotiating a side
agreement... [u]nfortunately, the final product negotiated by the
37Clinton administration falls far short of its stated purpose.
Additional critics estimated job loss resulting from NAFTA at over
500,000 and anticipated that companies in the U.S. would use the
NAFTA as leverage against their workers, thwarting union organizing
31. DAVID C. KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD, 144-145
(1995)[hereinafter KORTEN].
32. 1993 Hearing, supra note 24 (preliminary Analysis by the AFL-CIO).
33. See NAFTA, Chap. 11; see also 1993 Hearing, supra note 24 (preliminary Analysis
by the AFL-CIO).
34. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 22, at 2; and AFL-CIO: 23- BIENNIAL CONVENTION,
'99 RESOLUTIONS (1999) <http://www.aflcio.org/convention99/resl_6.htm> (visited Dec. 20,
1999).
35. See, e.g., Thea Lee, Happily Never NAFTA: There's No Such Thing as Free Trade,
THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE 70-77 (Victor Menotti ed., Earth Island Press and North
Atlantic Books 1993)[hereinafter THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE]; and 1993 Hearing, su-
pra note 24, at 169 (preliminary Analysis by the AFL-CIO).
36. John P. Isa, Testing the NAALC's Dispute Resolution System: A Case Study, 6 AM.
U.J. GENDER & LAW 615 (1998).
37. 1993 Hearing, supra note 24 (preliminary Analysis by the AFL-CIO).
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by threatening to move to Mexico.38 In his statement at the 1993 Senate
hearing on NAFTA, Thomas R. Donahue concluded that, all projections
aside:
The real story is not that NAFTA has the support of five former presi-
dents. Rather, it is the fact that NAFTA is understood and opposed by
the majority of American citizens - autoworkers in Illinois, truck driv-
ers in California, maritime workers on the East Coast. They know that
no promise of worker retraining, no breakthrough in technology, no
government-business partnership scheme, can bring back the jobs and
investment dollars that NAFTA will take from the U.S. under the con-
ditions enshrined by NAFTA.3 9
When labor unions demanded an equal voice at the NAFTA negoti-
ating table to ensure that labor rights were given the same merit as
capital mobility and investment protections, they were ignored, and
NAFTA negotiators ultimately crafted an unbalanced agreement bol-
stering commercial interests at the expense of labor rights. ° After ex-
haustive debate and massive grassroots opposition, the free-trade
champions triumphed and NAFTA was implemented January 1',
1994.4'
B. GATT/WTO
1. The Birth of the WTO: From Havana to Uruguay
NAFTA was the first major trade fight... A year after NAFTA took ef-
fect, a whole new trade regime came into being with the birth of the
[WTO] in January 1995, replacing the much looser set of agreements
that had regulated world trade since the late forties.42
The decades-long process of approving the GATT and WTO in 1994
actually began in 1948 with the Havana Charter. Struggling to recover
from the hardships of World War II and the Great Depression, countries
sought economic security through international cooperation.43 To that
end, fifty countries convened in 1946 to negotiate expeditious trade lib-
eralization and "to begin to correct the large legacy of protectionist
38. NAFTA AND BEYOND, supra note 20, at 451.
39. 1993 Hearing, supra note 24, at 168 (prepared statement by Thomas R. Donahue,
explain who he is).
40. See, e.g., Lori Wallach, Hidden Dangers of GATT and NAFTA, THE CASE AGAINST
FREE TRADE, supra note 35.
41. See NAFTA, supra note 18.
42. Doug Henwood, Whose Trade?, THE NATION, Dec. 6, 1999, at 11.
43. WHAT'S AT STAKE, supra note 3, at 10.
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measures which remained in place from the early 1930s."" This meet-
ing constituted the first of many future negotiating "rounds." Of the
fifty participating countries, twenty-three signed what is now known as
the Havana Charter.4 5 The Charter had two primary goals: to establish
a multilateral set of rules between participating countries and to estab-
lish a regulating body of which each contracting party was a member. 6
The multilateral rules, namely, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) was a combination of trade rules and "45,000 tariff con-
cessions affecting $10 billion of trade, about one-fifth of the world's to-
tal."4 ' From 1948 until the Uruguay Round in 1994, the GATT operated
as the primary provisional agreement regulating multilateral trade.48
The second goal of the Charter, to establish the International Trade Or-
ganization (ITO) as a regulating body, failed primarily due to opposition
from the U.S. Congress. 9 It was not until fifty years later that this goal
was finally achieved with the establishment of the WTO.5 0
2. The "New" GATT and the WTO
The Uruguay Round took seven and a half years, almost twice the
original schedule. By the end, 125 countries were taking part. It cov-
ered almost all trade, from toothbrushes to pleasure boats, from bank-
ing to telecommunications, from the genes of wild rice to AIDS treat-
ments. It was quite simply the largest trade negotiation ever, and most
probably the largest negotiation of any kind in history.5'
In several rounds of negotiations after the Havana Charter, an
ever-growing number of countries convened to expand the skeletal trad-
ing provisions outlined in the 1948 GATT. 5' The Uruguay Round was
44. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 9, at 8; see also WHAT'S AT STAKE, supra
note 3, at 11("During the 1930s, in the economic and social disaster of the Great Depres-
sion, countries turned inwards... they resorted to extreme protectionism, raising tariffs
and other trade barriers to levels that choked off imports, and setting up discriminatory
arrangements that favoured some countries and excluded others.").
45. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 9, at 8.
46. JOHN CROOME, Epilogue to RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 333 (World
Trade Organization 1999)[hereinafter CROOME].
47. Trading into the Future, supra note 9, at 8.
48. Id. at 9, 11 (unlike the GATT as reformed in 1994, the 1948 GATT was merely
provisional meaning it was never ratified by members' parliaments and therefore did not
constitute binding law).
49. Id. at 9.
50. CROOME, supra note 46, at 333-34.
51. Trading into the Future, supra note 9, at 12.
52. See generally CROOME, supra note 46, Foreword; and TRADING INTO THE FUTURE,
supra note 9, at 9 (The list of negotiating rounds and their subject matter after Hevana
include: Annecy on tariffs in 1949; Torquay on tariffs in 1951; Geneva on tariffs in 1956;
Dillon Round on tariffs 1960-61; Kennedy Round on tariffs and anti-dumping measures
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the most expansive of them all, broadening the 1948 GATT rules from
trade in goods to include trade in services, creating the WTO, and con-
structing an unprecedented dispute settlement mechanism.53 Explicitly
omitted from the 1994 GATT and WTO, however, are provisions on core
labor standards.5
The Uruguay Round was plagued with constant frustrations and
seemingly irreconcilable differences that took over seven years to sur-
mount. But even still, negotiating countries were not convinced of the
GATT or WTO's actual fruition until the U.S. Congress was ripe for
ratification. The negotiating countries had not forgotten 1948, when
congressional disapproval caused the demise of the ITO. Unlike the
1948 GATT, this proposal required that each members' parliament rat-
ify its provisions into law. Thus, a defining moment approving the
Uruguay Round was when Congress approved the NAFTA. 5 Negotiat-
ing countries viewed NAFTA approval as a crucial positive signal that
Congress would not reject the Uruguay Round proposals, and they were
right.56
Two key provisions of the GATT (also embodied in NAFTA) are
"most favored nation" 7 and "national treatment."58 Most favored nation
(MFN) requires governments to treat all products equally regardless of
their country of origin; and national treatment (NT) requires govern-
ments to accord foreign products the same treatment as domestic prod-
ucts. Thus, actual enforcement of the newly adopted ILO Convention
on exploitive child labor5 is ironically moot because the convention in-
herently violates these GATT principles - governments cannot ban
products made with child labor and favor products that are not.' These
1964-67; Tokyo Round on tariffs, non-tariff measures, and "framework" agreements 1973-
79; Uruguay Round on tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services, intellectual property,
dispute settlement, textiles, agriculture, and creation of the WTO 1986-94; and recently
the Seattle Round on the future working agenda of the WTO in 1999).
53. CROOME, supra note 46, at xiii (summarizing the substantive accomplishments
celebrated by negotiators of the Uruguay Round: ". . . the deep cuts to be made by all
countries in their barriers to trade; the coming liberalization, at last, of world trade in
agricultural products, textiles and clothing; the far-reaching overhaul of the rules for in-
ternational trade in goods; the new rules to govern and encourage trade in services and
the protection of intellectual property; the strengthened system to settle trade disputes
among governments; the new World Trade Organization that will put the whole trading
system on firm foundations for the first time.").
54. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) 1947, concluded at Geneva,
30 Oct. 1947, currently in effect as part of GATT 1994, Annex 1A [hereinafter GATT
1994]; see also TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 9, at 60.
55. CROOME, supra note 46, at 317.
56. Id.
57. GATT 1994, supra note 54, art. I.
58. GATT 1994, supra note 54, art. III.
59. See discussion infra note 181.
60. LORI WALLACH & MICHELLE SFORZA, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION? 175 (Public
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provisions are especially powerful when combined with the GATT's un-
precedented dispute resolution mechanism. 1
C. Cloning NAFTA and GATTI WTO.
Having won the hard fought battle for NAFTA and GATT/WTO,
62
the Clinton Administration has wasted no time attempting to replicate
the pacts with regional trading blocs around the world.' Thus,
NAFTA's flaws are relevant not only to the three States currently
bound by the pact, but also to the countless regions where the Clinton
Administration intends to expand NAFTA-like accords. Negotiations to
expand NAFTA into Chile have been contemplated for several years
with the only hold-up being the fast-track debate6 and on-going debate
in the Congress contemplates NAFTA-like accords with Africa and the
Caribbean Basin.6 The NAFTA has also spurred negotiations for the
Free Trade Agreement of the Americans (FTAA), a free trade pact that
would create one market "from Alaska to the Tierra del Fuego.""6 The
FTAA now has support from every Latin American country except Cuba
and would "create a free trade zone of nearly one billion consumers,
with a gross domestic product reaching at least $9 trillion by the year
2005. ,67
Indeed, part of the volatility surrounding the NAFTA and the
GATT/WTO is because its proponents extol the agreements as a model
for trade policy worldwide. Pointing to "runaway plants, lost jobs, de-
Citizen 1999)(emphasis added) [hereinafter WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION?].
61. UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES, concluded at Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2; reprinted in
33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994)[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING ON DISPUTES].
62. The Uruguay Round not only established the member organization, WTO, but
also expanded the 1948 GATT, which focused on simply trade in goods, to include trade in
services, intellectual property, and to establish the most expansive international dispute
settlement system to date. See generally, TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 9.
63. James M. Cooper, Spirits in the Material World: A Post-Modern Approach to
United States Trade Policy, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 957, 979-80 (1999).
64. Carol Pier, Labor Rights in Chile and NAFTA Labor Standards: Questions of
Compatibility on the Eve of Free Trade, 19 COMP. LAB. L. 185 (Winter 1998) (Fast-track
authority gives the United States President executive power to negotiate trade agree-
ments and limits Congressional input to a mere "yes" or "no" vote after extremely limited
debate and with no power to change or otherwise amend the text. Chilean leaders will not
sign a NAFTA with the United States until it has the guarantee of fast-track because they
do not want Congressional scrutiny. Due to congressional skepticism and public dissent,
Clinton has not yet convinced Congress to renew fast-track authority).
65. Bureau of National Affairs, Ways and Means Approves Sub-Saharan Trade
Measure, Daily Report for Executives, Jun. 11, 1999.
66. Second Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Santiago, Santiage de Chile Apr.
18-19, 1998 at <http://www.summitamericas.org/chiledc.htm>.
67. Id.
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clining tax bases, and increased downward pressures on the wages and
benefits" of American workers, Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur warned
that if NAFTA "is intended to be a blueprint for future accords" than we
must first reexamine its impact and "if we can't fix it, then we should
junk it." 6
III. NAFTA'S FREE TRADE RULES: CORPORATE VERSUS WORKER RIGHTS.
From GATT to NAFTA... Agreements where the protections for in-
ternational investors and transnational corporations would fill every
phonebook in my home state of Michigan - but where the guarantees
for workers, consumers and the environment could be written on a
postcard ... Agreements which make it easier to challenge the in-
fringement of a copyright than the imprisonment of a striking worker. 69
Absent in the body of the NAFTA and the GATT/ WTO texts are
meaningful, binding provisions to enforce labor rights and protections.
According to the International Chamber of Commerce, "the trading sys-
tem was not designed to address these non-trade issues ... [tjo call on
it to do so would expose the trading system to great strain and the risk
00
of increased protectionism...
A. A Corporate Bill of Rights
Perhaps the most poignant difference between corporate (or inves-
tor) rights and workers' rights in the NAFTA, is the mechanism for en-
forcement. Chapter 11 of the NAFTA provides that private investors,
on behalf of themselves or on behalf of an enterprise, may directly sue a
national government - a powerful grant of legal standing.1 Under Ar-
ticle 1116, a claim may be submitted to arbitration if an investor be-
lieves that a government has breached an obligation under the NAFTA
and that the breach caused the investor to incur a loss or damage as a
result. 2 Nowhere in the NAFTA is this kind of extraordinary power
granted to a worker if the worker believes that another Party has
caused them damage as a result of job loss, wage reduction, or poor
working conditions.
68. Id. at 24 (statement of Hon. Marcy Kaptur, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Ohio).
69. Statement by Congressman David E. Bonior (D-MI), Defending Democracy in the
New Global Economy, Speaking at a conference hosted by the AFL-CIO on Workers'
Rights, Trade Development, and the WTO (Dec. 1, 1999).
70. Peter Capella, Business Backs Trade Role for UN, THE GUARDIAN, London, July 6,
1999.
71. NAFTA, Chap. 11, art. 1116
72. Id.
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Corporations have an additional dispute remedy provided in Article
20 of the NAFTA. Article 2018 provides that when a government is not
in conformity with NAFTA provisions, the government must either
agree not to implement the offending measure (typically a federal law)
or agree to remove the offending measure. 3 If the government contin-
ues to be in noncompliance, appropriate compensation must be offered
or the aggrieved party may suspend benefits until a settlement is
reached.74 Both the settlement between the Canadian federal govern-
ment and Ethyl Corporation and the recent Loewen Funeral Home
Trial Case demonstrate how powerful a corporation becomes using the
NAFTA investor-state dispute procedure to enforce their rights in the
global economy.m
1.Ethyl
In the interest of protecting public health, Canada in 1997 banned
the importation and transport of methylcyclopentadienyl manganese
tricarbonyl (MMT), a gasoline additive and dangerous neurotoxin al-
ready banned by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 6 Ethyl
Corporation based in the United States, produces MMT and until the
ban enjoyed steady sales to Canadian gasoline refiners." Six months
before the legislation passed in the Canadian Parliament, Ethyl at-
tempted to block the law by notifying the Canadian government that if
the law prevailed, the corporation intended to sue for monetary dam-
ages under NAFTA Chapter 11. 78 In spite of Ethyl's threats, Canada
passed the ban and less than a week later Ethyl filed a claim for $250
million in damages. 7' Ethyl claimed that the Canadian import ban
constituted an illegal expropriation (a taking of private property for
public use) by precluding sales to Canadian refiners and by tarnishing
the company's "good reputation.""
Rather than face the $250 million in damages, Canada instead
chose to settle the case. The Canadian government repealed its ban on
73. NAFTA, Chap. 20, art. 2018.
74. NAFTA, Chap. 20, art. 2019.
75. Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada: Now Investors Can Use NAFTA to
Challenge Environmental Safeguards (Public Citizen Briefing Paper)
<http://www/citizen.org/pctrade/nafta/cases/Ethylbri.htm> (visited Dec. 19,
1999)[hereinafter Ethyl Briefing Paper].
76. BRIEFING PAPER, NAFTA's CORPORATE LAwsUITS 2 (Friends of the Earth and
Public Citizen, Apr. 1999).
77. Id.
78. Id. See also MAUDE BARLOw & TONY CLARKE, MAI: THE MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT AND THE THREAT TO AMERICAN FREEDOM 61 (Stoddart Publ'g
Co. Ltd. 1998)[hereinafter MAI].
79. The Sting in Trade's Tail, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 1998.
80. Ethyl Briefing Paper, supra note 75, at 1.
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MMT and agreed to pay Ethyl $13 million (USD) in compensation.81 To
restore the damage caused to Ethyl's reputation, the Canadian govern-
ment was required to issue a statement that MMT poses no health
risk.2
This case raises two significant concerns among NAFTA opponents.
First, NAFTA's dispute settlement provisions enable foreign corpora-
tions to intimidate governments by threatening to sue over potentially
unfavorable legislation.3 Taken in the context of labor, corporations
could threaten to challenge minimum wage or occupational safety laws
to prevent increased employment costs. Second, allowing corporations
to directly sue governments for limitless monetary damages could
mean, as it did in the Ethyl case, that governments would rather over-
turn vital public legislation than face monetary damages.'
2. Loewen Funeral Home Trial Case
Another case that exemplifies the extraordinary power conveyed to
corporations under NAFTA is the Loewen Funeral Home Trial Case.
The Loewen Group, a Canadian-based funeral home conglomerate, was
the defendant in a Mississippi lawsuit and found liable for fraud and
gross business conduct.85 The trial focused on Loewen's aggressive at-
tempts to ruin a small local funeral home and insurance operator, and
the jury awarded damages to the plaintiff in the amount of $100 million
in compensatory damages and $400 million in punitive damages. 6 Ac-
cording to Mississippi state law, losing defendants must post a bond
worth 125% of damages owed before entitled to pursue a civil appeal.
Rather than appeal, Loewen settled the case for $150 million.
Now, Loewen has filed a claim for $725 million from the U.S. gov-
ernment under NAFTA's Chapter 11 claiming that the jury verdict, the
punitive damages, and the bond requirement "violated international le-
gal norms of 'fairness,' discriminated against the Canadian-based cor-
poration and attempted to 'expropriate' or seize Loewen's assets. . ." in
derogation of NAFTA guarantees. 88 In addition, Loewen claims that
81. Id.
82. NAFTA's CORPORATE LAWSUITS, supra note 76, at 2.
83. See generally id.; MAI, supra note 78, at 61; and Ethyl Briefing Paper, supra note
75, at 1.
84. Id.
85. PUBLIC CITIZEN GLOBAL TRADE WATCH, Briefing Paper: Canadian Corporation
Found Liable in Mississippi Courts Uses NAFTA to Claim Legal System Violated Its
Rights at <http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/nafta/cases/Loewen.htm> (visited Dec. 12, 1999)
[hereinafter Loewen Briefing Paper].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Loewen Briefing Paper, supra note 85, at 2; and NAFTA'S CORPORATE
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the Mississippi court system was plagued with an "anti-Canadian
bias."8 9 The Loewen case is concerning to the public interest community
because corporations could utilize NAFTA as a tool to evade liability in
local courts - particularly civil and tort liability.9° For workers, who
lack judicious remedies in the international system, this threatens to
take away their only mechanism for justice, namely, domestic courts.
B. Workers Rights: The North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation (NAALC).
In response to the forcible NAFTA opposition from organized labor,
the U.S. was compelled to condition its ratification of NAFTA on the
drafting of a labor side agreement - the North American Agreement
on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).9' Although the purported purpose of
the NAALC was to ensure protection for workers from adverse NAFTA
backfire, the final agreement is a fiction. Because all three govern-
ments resisted a labor side agreement that would restrict their sover-
eign right to control domestic labor laws, the language of the NAALC is
deliberately vague. 9 The Mexican government was particularly resis-
tant of the NAALC. To them, cheap labor and lax labor laws are a com-
petitive advantage without which foreign investment could decline.93
Thus, Mexico's support of the NAALC was dependent on vague lan-
guage and total control over domestic labor laws. In addition, NAFTA
drafters feared that enforcement of stringent labor laws would impose
new trade barriers and thereby defeat the central purpose of the pact.'
For the foregoing reasons, the NAALC did not oblige the govern-
ment "Parties" to adhere to an internationally set core labor standard,
and did not even oblige the Parties to strengthen existing domestic
standards, but rather, it simply required that Parties enforce the stan-
dards that were already on the books in their respective countries.95 "In
the end, the NAALC was approved containing strong language in sup-
port of workers' rights but weak mechanisms for ensuring their respect
in the signatories' countries."'  As provided in Article 3 of the agree-
ment, the purpose of the NAALC is "to promote compliance with and ef-
LAWSUITS, supra note 76, at 5.
89. NAFTA's CORPORATE LAWSUITS, supra note 76, at 5.
90. Id.
91. NAFrA AND BEYOND, supra note 20, at 450.
92. Isa, supra note 36, at 615.
93. Isa, supra note 36, at 616.
94. NAFrA AND BEYOND, supra note 20, at 450.
95. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, at
<http://www.naalc.org/english/infocentre/NAALC.htm> (visited Apr. 7, 2000), arts. 2, 3
[hereinafter NAALCI.
96. Joel Solomon, Mexico, Labor Rights and NAFTA, 8 HUM. RTS. WATCH/AMS 2
(1996)[hereinafter Solomon].
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fectively enforce" each Party's own domestic labor laws.97 Article 2
summarizes the "Levels of Protection" embodied in the NAALC:
Affirming full respect for each Party's constitution, and recognizing the
right of each Party to establish its own domestic labor standards, and
to adopt or modify accordingly its labor laws and regulations, each
Party shall ensure that its labor laws and regulations provide for high
labor standards, consistent with high quality and productivity work-
places, and shall continue to strive to improve those standards in that
light.98
The NAALC lays out eleven labor principles "that the Parties are
committed to promote, subject to each Party's domestic law, but do not
establish common minimum standards for their domestic law:
1. Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize
2. The right to bargain collectively
3. The right to strike
4. Prohibition of forced labor
5. Labor protections for children and young persons
6. Minimum employment standards
7. Elimination of employment discrimination
8. Equal pay for women and men
9. Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses
10.Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses
11.Protection of migrant workers."
These principles provide a fine framework for thinking about labor
issues, but are meaningless because they lack effective enforcement ca-
pability. Although NAFTA proponents point to the NAALC's extremely
97. NAALC, supra note 95, art. 3.
98. Id.
99. Id. at Annex 1.
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limited enforcement mechanisms as a coup for labor advocates, these
mechanisms are deliberately convoluted such that "the process weeds
out most labor-related issues from the ultimate enforcement weapon of
imposing sanctions."'0
Structurally, the Commission for Labor Cooperation, Ministerial
Council is the highest level of the NAALC and facilitates cooperative
compliance among the Parties.'O Below the Ministerial Council, each
Party has a National Administrative Office, or NAO, that serves as an
in-country contact on NAFTA labor issues.1" Allegations that a Party
has violated the principles of the NAALC are first received by the
NAO.'13 The NAO then determines if the complaint warrants review
and if so, initiates consultations with the accused Party. 4 The NAO re-
view is the first of many daunting hurdles that an aggrieved worker,
public interest group, labor organization or other complainant must
face. There are no enforcement provisions at this consultation level,
only cooperation and recommendation.' 05 Typically, violations of free-
dom of association, the right to organize, and the right to strike and
bargain collectively never exceed this first level of review."a
Only consultations that have reached the Ministerial Council may
continue to the second phase of enforcement. However, the issue must
involve one of the following: "forced labor, equal pay for men and
women, worker' compensation, and protection for migrant workers."0 7
Violations in these areas not resolved by the Ministerial Council un-
dergo evaluation by an independent panel of experts called the Evalua-
tion Committee of Experts, or ECE.'' However, as provided in Article
49, before an ECE is commissioned, the issues must be either "trade-
related" or covered by "mutually recognized labor laws."' °9 Even at this
level, the only remedy of the ECE is "non-adversarial and non-binding
recommendations on the issue. '" ° If the ECE determines the issue does
not meet the appropriate criteria "the Party has no other recourse.""
If the ECE deems the issue worthy, recommendations are submit-
ted to the Ministerial Council. The Ministerial Council is then only ob-
100. NAFTA AND BEYOND, supra note 20, at 456
101. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Review of the NAALC Annual
Report, at <http://www.naalc.org/english/publicationsreview-annexll.htm>
102. Id.
103. NAALC, supra note 95, art. 3.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Solomon, supra note 96, at 2.
107. Id. at 3.
108. NAALC, supra note 95, art. 23.
109. Id., art. 49
110. Solomon, supra note 96, at 3.
111. NAFTA AND BEYOND, supra note 20, at 457.
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ligated to respond to violations of child labor, minimum wage, and oc-
cupational health and safety.12 Even if the violations qualify, the Min-
isterial Council may only respond if proof exists of a "persistent pattern
of failure by the other Party to effectively enforce" those standards."
Thus, a single incident of failure that results in egregious harm would
not qualify unless repeatedly occurring. Perhaps the grandest loophole
of the NAALC enforcement mechanism is found in Article 49 defining
"failure":
A Party has not failed... where the action or inaction by agencies or of-
ficials of that Party: (a) reflects a reasonable exercise of the agency's or
the official's discretion ... ; or (b) results from bona fide decision to allo-
cate resources to enforcement in respect of other labor matters deter-
mined to have higher priorities.1
4
So long as Parties can demonstrate that their failure to comply
with labor standards was the consequence of a "reasonable" exercise of
"discretion" or the result of a "bona fide" prioritization, than govern-
ments are off the hook. Combined with the burden to prove a "persis-
tent pattern" of failure that was unreasonable, non-discretionary and
wrongly prioritized, workers have little chance to successfully adjudi-
cate their grievances.
Arbitration may be sought if resolution has failed, but only upon a
two-thirds vote of the Ministerial Council."' The arbitration panel may
impose fines or sanctions but only for persistent patterns of child labor,
occupational safety and health or minimum wage violations that are
trade-related and covered by mutually recognized labor law." 6
The NAALC and its lack of accessible enforcement mechanism may
have been a temporary resolution to allow NAFTA passage, but if labor
rights are to be truly respected worldwide this kind of agreement must
be reformed. According to the AFL-CIO:
[The NAALCI, established a lengthy and cumbersome process to im-
pose penalties if a country persistently fails to enforce minimum wage,
child labor and safety and health protections. But there are no penal-
ties for violations of freedom of association and workers' right to organ-
ize, which is why most unions regard the NAALC protections as inade-
quate.1
7
Steve Beckman, an international economist for the International
112. NAALC, supra note 95, art. 27.
113. Id., art. 27.
114. Id., art. 49.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. WORKERS' RIGHTS, supra note 12.
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Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW) assessed the NAALC as an utter failure:
Violations of the fundamental rights of freedom of association and the
right to organize and bargain are not even subject to the labor side
agreement dispute resolution procedures. The cases that have been
filed have not led to the illegally fired workers being rehired, and the
offending employers have suffered no sanctions. The ability of inde-
pendent unions to survive and expand in Mexico has not been advance
by the NAALC. They remain under attack."8
In sum, corporations under NAFTA enjoy the power to sway legis-
lation, to overturn domestic laws that infringe on their profits, to de-
mand compensation for any expropriation of profits, and to exercise
unlimited capital mobility; while workers are forced to endure the ex-
tremely limited, virtually remediless bureaucracy of the NAALC.
IV. THE GATT/WTO: LABOR STANDARDS "NOT ON THE AGENDA.""' 9
As seen in both the NAFTA and GATT/WTO negotiations and final
texts, labor issues are deliberately omitted and instead deferred to side
agreements such as the NAALC and alternative institutions, such as
the United Nations or the International Labor Organization. Trade bu-
reaucrats openly advocate that enforceable labor standards incorpo-
rated into the rules-based trading system would create protectionist
policies that impede the ultimate commercial goal of "trade flow as free
as possible."'2 ° As well, many developing countries of the WTO resist
enforceable core labor standards for fear that such standards "under-
mine the comparative advantage of lower wage trading partners."'
2
'
Yet, in the words of the WTO itself: "[wlithout a means of settling dis-
putes, the rules-based system would be worthless because the rules
could not be enforced." Accordingly, the GATT/WTO established the
strongest international enforcement measures of any multilateral
agreement to date but for corporate rights, not labor rights.
A. Dispute Settlement under the GATT/WTO.
The former Director General of the WTO proudly acclaims that the
dispute settlement procedure is the WTO's "most individual contribu-
118. President's Comprehensive Review of the NAFTA, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105' Cong. 200 (1997) [hereinafter
Hearing on President's Report] (statement of Steve Beckmen, international economist,
International Union, UAW), available at 1997 WL 570269.
119. Trading into the Future, supra note 9, at 60.
120. Id. at 3, 60.
121. Id. at 60; Solomon, supra note 96, at 2.
2000
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
tion.' ' n Unlike the United Nations, the ILO, the NAALC, or any other
international body, the WTO has granted itself enforcement powers to
"demand compliance from its members, and to coerce and force compli-
ance where necessary by means of a variety of disciplines, penalties,
and trade sanctions...
Procedurally, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism embodied in
GATT Articles XXII and XXIII, apply strictly to "consultations and the
settlement of disputes between Members concerning their rights and ob-
ligations.."124 The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) holds express quasi-
judicial authority to settle disputes between member countries by the
establishment of dispute panels and the rejection (by consensus) of their
recommendations. 12' A dispute panel is only convened after a requisite
sixty-day consultation period. 126 If consultations fail, the disputing par-
ties seek resolution from a three-person dispute resolution panel, or tri-
bunal. The panelists are selected by the parties from a designated list
of "trade officials and commercial trade lawyers. 127 Once the panel is-
sues a ruling against a country, the country faces suspension of benefits
and trade sanctions unless they overturn or conform the offending law,
or pay permanent compensation to the impacted country.' The loosing
country can appeal, but the ruling is only overturned by a unanimous
vote of all 135 members - including the country that brought the chal-
lenge. 9
Critics of the GATT/WTO oppose this dispute mechanism because it
allows member countries to challenge virtually any domestic law if it
can be shown that the law impedes the free flow of trade.3 '
To date, WTO tribunals have almost always sided
with a challenging country and ruled against the tar-
geted law. In only three out of 22 completed WTO cases
did the respondents win. As of July 1999, the U.S. had
lost every completed case brought against it, with the
WTO labeling as illegal U.S. policies ranging from sea
turtle protection and clean air regulations to anti-
122. About the WTO: The WTO's 'most individual contribution' at
<http://www.wto.org/wto/about/disputel.htm> (visited Mar. 3, 2000).
123. Invisible Government, supra note 1, at 2.
124. UNDERSTANDING ON DISPUTES, supra note 61, Annex 2, art. 1(1). (emphasis
added).
125. Id. at Annex 2, arts. 2, 11.
126. Id. at Annex 2, art. 16.
127. INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT, supra note 1, at 8.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 7.
VOL. 28:4
FREE TRADE AND WORKERS' RIGHTS
dumping duties."'
Further, critics argue that the dispute resolution process is con-
ducted in secret without public participation or accountability:32 The
press, the public, labor unions and other non-governmental organiza-
tions are totally excluded at each stage of the stealth dispute settlement
process.
A recent example of how the WTO dispute resolution mechanism
impacts domestic law is the Massachusetts selective purchasing law. In
1996, Massachusetts passed a law banning state contracts with compa-
nies that invest in or do business with Burma.'T The Burmese govern-
ment had been executing egregious human and labor rights violations,
including forced labor of women, children, elderly and other unfit citi-
zens." *' The Massachusetts law, along with dozens of similar municipal
and county ordinances, was passed to "ensure that public money is not
used to indirectly support a regime whose conduct taxpayers find re-
pugnant" and to encourage transnational corporations to divest in
Burma.13 The law was attacked on two fronts: in the U.S. courts by the
powerful corporate lobby USA*Engage, 7 and in the WTO by Japan and
131. WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION?, supra note 60, at 194.
132. Id. at 197 ("Under this WTO rule, dispute panels operate in secret, documents are
restricted to the counties in the dispute, due process and citizen participation are absent
and no outside appeal is available.").
133. Invisible Government, supra note 1, at 8.
134. See The Case Against the WTO, THE PROGRESSIVE 9 (Jan. 2000)[hereinafter The
Case Against the WTOI.
135. See e.g., International Labor Organization, Forced Labour in Mynammar, July 21,
1998, at<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relni/gb/docs/gb273/mynammar.htm>
(visited Apr. 6, 2000) ("There is abundant evidence before the Commission showing the
pervasive use of forced labor imposed on the civilian population throughout Myanmar...
sometimes for the profit of private individuals... all of the information and evidence be-
fore the Commission shows utter disregard by the [government] authorities for the safety
and health as well as the basic needs of the people performing forced or compulsory la-
bor.").
136. WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION?, supra note 60, at 187-88; see also INVISIBLE
GOVERNMENT, supra 1, at 38 (It was precisely these kind of sanctions that were used in
the anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s to "hasten the transition to democracy in South
Africa.").
137. USA*Engage is a coalition of 674 American businesses, including huge multina-
tional corporations such as ARCO, AT&T, Boeing, Coca-Cola, Dow Chemical, GTE, IBM,
and Proctor & Gamble. For a complete list of members see
<http://usaengage.org/background/about.html> (visited Mar. 10, 2000). The coalition was
launched on April 16', 1997 primarily for the purpose of fighting trade sanctions such as
this. They claim that "sanctions don't work, and only serve to cut U.S. firms out of lucra-
tive deals while giving them a reputation for unreliability." So far, USA*Engage has suc-
ceeded: the Massachusetts state court and a subsequent appellate court has ruled that
the law is an unconstitutional intrusion into foreign policy powers. The challenge is now
facing a Supreme Court review. Bernard J. Woflson, Group decries Mass. Law on busi-
ness with Burma, BOSTON HERALD (May 1, 1998) found at
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the European Union. The Japan/EU challenge claims such sanctions
are patent violations of GATT rules and therefore should be over-
turned.' 3 Meanwhile, to avoid additional embarrassing WTO chal-
lenges, President Clinton has dispatched his Administration to prevent
passage of similar human rights sanctions. 139 In 1998, the Administra-
tion successfully persuaded the Maryland legislature to abandon a law
barring business with Nigeria.
40
This case is an important statement, not only to the sovereignty of
local governments to enact their own public policy, but also to the mer-
its of the ILO. If the WTO turns a blind eye to the ILO report, which
details abundant evidence of egregious human and labor rights viola-
tions, than what does that say about the effectiveness of ILO protec-
tions for workers?
B. Labor Rights Deferred to the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Rather than address labor standards within the WTO, member
countries defer all labor issues to the International Labor Organization
(ILO), founded in 1919 at the Peace Conference in Paris, France.14 ' The
Peace Conference set up the Labour Commission, who wrote the ILO
Constitution between April and January 1919.' The Labour Commis-
sion also elects the Governing Body, the ILO Executive Council, struc-
tured as a tripartite organization by specifically electing representa-
tives of governments, employers and workers. 44 The two principle
functions of the ILO are to set labor standards and to promote the ob-
servance of those standards through good faith and, essentially, peer
pressure.14' These standards are embodied in Conventions and Recom-
<http://usaengage.org/news/980501bh.html> (visited Mar. 10, 2000).
138. Under GATT rules, when a state or local law is challenged the federal govern-
ment is responsible for bringing that sovereign into compliance. WHOSE TRADE
ORGANIZATION?, supra note 60, at 194.
139. The Case Against the WTO, supra note 134.
140. Id.
141. International Labor Organization, ILO History at <http://www.ilo.org/public/
englisbabout/history.htm> (visited Mar. 5, 2000)(the nine founding countries of the La-
bour Commission were Belgium, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Japan, Poland, the
United Kingdom and the United States under the chairmanship of American Federation
of Labour head Samuel Gompers); see also TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 9, at 45.
142. Id.
143. See ILO Constitution < http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm> (vis-
ited Apr. 5, 2000); ILO History <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/history.htm> (vis-
ited Mar. 5, 2000).
144. ILO Constitution, supra note 143, at Ch. 1, art. 7 (1) (the Governing Body shall
consist of fifty-six persons: Twenty-eight representing governments, fourteen representing
the employers, and fourteen representing the workers); see also ILO History
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/history.htm> (visited Mar. 5, 2000).
145. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-
VOL. 28:4
FREE TRADE AND WORKERS' RIGHTS
mendations debated, drafted, and eventually ratified by willing coun-
tries.
1 46
At the core of the ILO Conventions are four fundamental rights
which all Members, whether they have ratified the Conventions or not,
"have an obligation... to respect, to promote and to realize, in good
faith...: (1) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the
right to collective bargaining; (2) the elimination of all forms of forced or
compulsory labour; (3) the effective abolition of child labour; and (4) the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupa-
tion. 
1 47
While the Conventions espouse seemingly industrious labor stands,
in fact the principles are meaningless without a concomitant enforce-
ment mechanism. Exactly like the NAALC, the ILO lacks any teeth.
For example, ILO Conventions 98 and 87, freedom of association and
collectively bargaining, respectively, and the ILO Constitution itself,14"
establish a quasi-judicial committee to which complaints may be filed
by either workers or employers 9 Upon receipt of the complaint, the
committee notifies the government concerned and, with their permis-
sion only, the committee may conduct an onsite investigation. 150  The
committee collects all the evidence and may issue a proposal' for re-
medial action: "[tihe committee's effectiveness has, like that of the ILO
itself, been limited by the fact that it has neither sanctions nor re-
sources with which to induce an offending government to change its be-
havior. It has relied upon public suasion and moral authority.''5 2 Thus,
the most powerful remedies for aggrieved workers under the ILO are
up (June 1998) [hereinafter ILO Declaration].
146. ILO Constitution, supra note 143, at ch. 1, art. 19 (some of the most significant
Conventions to date include: No. 29, Forced Labour, 1930; No. 87, Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organize, 1948; No. 98, Right to Organize and Collective
Bargaining, 1949; No. 100, Equal Renumeration, 1951; No. 105, Abolition of Forced La-
bour, 1957; No. 111, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), 1958; No. 138, Mini-
mum Age, 1973; and the most recent No. 182, Worst Forms of Child Labour); see gener-
ally, ILO, ILO Declaration on Principles: A New Instrument to Promote Fundamental
Rights, Annex III, ISBN 92-2-111892-4 (2000).
147. ILO Declaration, supra note 145, at art. 2 (a)-(d).
148. ILO Constitution, supra note 143, at Ch. 1, art. 26.
149. Jerome Levinson, Certifying International Workers Rights: A Practical Alterna-
tive, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE 6, (May 1999) [hereinafter A Practical Alternative], at
<http:/epinet.org> (last visited Apr. 5, 2000).
150. Id.
151. ILO Constitution, supra note 143, at ch. 1, art. 28.
152. Levinson, supra note 149; see ILO Constitution, supra note 143, ch.1, art 29 (1) -
(2) (the findings of the committee shall be published, then it is within the offending gov-
ernment's own discretion to either voluntarily accept the recommendation, and if not,
whether it will choose to submit the complaint to the International Court of Justice -
there are no consequences if the offending government neither accepts nor submits the
recommendation).
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remedial proposals, public persuasion and moral authority - a far cry
from commercial protections under GATT/WTO-like trade sanctions, an
elaborate dispute settlement body, and uncapped monetary compensa-
tion. 153
In June 1998, the ILO adopted new measures to promote the fun-
damental principles: the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work and Its Follow-up (Declaration)." Under the Dec-
laration, ILO Member States who have not ratified a particular ILO
Convention are now nonetheless obligated to honor "in good faith and in
accordance with the Constitution, the principles" therein.'5 5 The Decla-
ration also requires "an annual follow-up concerning non-ratified fun-
damental Conventions"'15 6 and a global report covering one of the four
fundamental rights each in turn.57
While the ILO has made strides in crafting diligent labor stan-
dards, far more must be done to equalize labor protections with com-
mercial protections. As stated by the AFL-CIO:
[Ilt is not possible for the ILO to take exclusive responsibility for ad-
dressing workers' rights violations. The ILO neither has nor seeks en-
forcement powers - making it all the more critical that international
trade and financial organizations repair a trading system that now re-
wards those who abuse workers' rights ... The WTO enforces intellec-
tual property rights, market access and government regulation of in-
vestment - and there is no reason why it also cannot enforce basic
minimum standards for the humane and decent treatment of work-
158
ers.
As evidenced by the massive labor demonstrations during the 1999
Seattle Round, labor leaders are resolved to oppose future free trade ac-
cords "until labor has as much influence over the deals being hashed
out as do business groups 159
V. THE CURRENT TRADE MODEL: RHETORIC AND REALITIES
The immobility of labor and the mobility of* capital is the supposed
"genius" of the capitalist (global capitalism) production system - buy
labor cheaply, sell goods dearly in the most wealthy markets with no
tariff barriers. It sounds like GATT, NAFTA and WTO and free trade
153. Supra note 110, at 196.
154. ILO Declaration, supra note 145, at art. 2 (a)-(d).
155. Id. at art. 2.
156. Id. at annex 1 (3).
157. Id. at annex III (A)(2).
158. WORKERs' RIGHTS, supra note 12, at5.
159. Frank Swoboda, Labor Wants Seat at WTO Talks, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1999.
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ideology. If any theory in terms of public policy sounds one-sided and
is fishy-smelling, it is a deal like that.. .Labor cannot do anything but
lose....
Now, five years since implementation, the NAFTA and GATT/WTO
debates are no less dubious than when first proposed. The NAFTA Im-
plementation Act required the President to provide to Congress, by no
later than July 1, 1997, a comprehensive review of the effects of the
agreement including the extent to which wages and working conditions
had been impacted."6 ' The President's report stirred a new round of
NAFTA controversy in Congress, in the public interest community, and
among the populous of the three nations.
Congressman Philip M. Crane, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, opened a September 1997
hearing on the President's report by saying; "The President's report...
confirms my view that NAFTA has had a decidedly positive impact on
the U.S. economy by increasing the competitiveness of U.S. industry
and contributing to the creation of high-wage jobs for U.S. workers."'1
62
In same hearing, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Jeffrey Lang sum-
marized key points of the report: "[tihe President's July Study indicates
the NAFTA has had a positive impact on our GDP, employment, in-
come, investment, and wages ... These estimates suggest that the
NAFTA's impact, isolated from other factors, has boosted jobs associ-
ated with exports to Mexico between roughly 90,000 and 160,000. 06
Conversely, the non-profit fair trade group Public Citizen's Global
Trade Watch, found the President's report less than accurate
"[u]nfortunately, you would be more likely to find little green men on
Mars than the truth about NAFTA in the Administration report... The
evidence of NAFTA's failure is overwhelming..."64
Public Citizen reported that up to 500,000 jobs had been lost as a
result of NAFTA and despite promises otherwise, "it has been high-
wage, high-tech jobs that have led U.S. NAFTA job losses ... U.S. data
shows a majority of U.S. workers who lose their high-wage manufactur-
ing jobs find new employment in lower-paying jobs in the service sec-
tor."'60 In a February 1999 address, the AFL-CIO announced that the
160. SAARI, supra note 14, at 128.
161. Section 512 of Pub.L. 103-182.
162. Hearing on President's Report, supra note 118 (statement by Congressman Philip
Crane), available at 1997 WL 574986.
163. Id. at 38 (statement of Hon. Jeffrey Lang, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative)
found in Westlaw at 1997 WL 609767.
164. Lori Wallach, Clinton Administration's NAFTA Report, Public Citizen Global
Trade Watch News Release (July 11, 1997) <http://www/citizen.org> (visited Apr. 5, 2000).
165. Id.
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United States has lost 285,000 jobs since March 1998.26
In a 1997 study, the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) tackled the
complicated task of untangling the conflicting numbers donned by both
pro and anti-NAFTA advocates. EPI discovered that failing to account
for all economic factors, including exports and imports, resulted in
many misleading figures:
This study's new model indicates that the reduction in net exports to
Mexico has eliminated 227,663 U.S. job opportunities since 1993, and
the reduction in net exports to Canada has eliminated 167,172 job op-
portunities in the same period. In total, NAFTA resulted in a net loss
of 394,835 jobs in its first three years.167
The study also found that a disproportionate number of these job
losses were suffered by minorities, women, white males and especially
in the manufacturing sector: "Even workers who found new jobs in the
growing U.S. economy face a reduction in wages, with average earning
dropping over 16%. ' 16 Moreover, a 1999 follow-up report by EPI indi-
cated that job losses have continued since the implementation of
NAFTA:
The U.S. Department of Labor has certified that 216,156 workers
have lost their jobs because of either shifts in production to Mexico or
Canada or because of increased imports from those countries.0
69
Larry Martin, President of the American Apparel Manufacturers
Association, frankly stated in his testimony to the House Subcommittee
on Trade; "[t]he fact of the matter is that it is no longer economically
feasible to make some kinds of garments in the United States. Our av-
erage wage level of about $8 an hour, plus benefits, makes it very diffi-
cult to compete with countries where wages are measured in cents, not
dollars."'7 ° Jay Mazur, President of the Union of Needletraders, Indus-
trial and Textile Employees (UNITE) challenges Congress to disallow
such corporate strategies; "NAFTA contributes to a corporate strategy -
investment overseas, production cutbacks at home and sharp demands
for wage and benefit concessions from workers - that has had a devas-
166. AFL-CIO, Trade and Deindustrialization, (Feb. 18, 1999)
<http://www/aflcio.org/publ/estatements/feb99/cstrade.htm> (visited Apr. 5, 1999).
167. Jesse Rothstein and Robert Scott, NAFTA's Casualties: Employment Effects on
Men, Women, and Minorities, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE ISSUE BRIEF #120, Sept. 19,
1997, at <http://www.epinet.org/Issuebriefs/ibl20.html> (visited Apr. 5, 2000).
168. Id.
169. Robert E. Scott, Trade deficits, job losses increase through 1998, ECONOMIC
POLICY INSTITUTE, TRADE FAX (Feb. 19, 1999), at <http://www.epinet.org>.
170. Hearing on President's Report, supra note 36 (statement of Larry Martin, Presi-
dent, American Apparel Manufacturers Association), available in Westlaw, at 1997 WL
566021.
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tating impact on American families." '
The 5-year progress reports on the GATT/WTO are similarly at
variance. While GATT/WTO proponents point to liberalized market ac-
cess and increases in export jobs; opponents focus on the increasing gap
between the rich and poor and the WTO's ability to threaten, weaken,
and overturn national laws. The WTO distributed a press packet at the
Seattle Round that touted "1.3 million new jobs supported by exports
were created in the U.S. between 1994 and 1998."'' 7 Conversely, oppo-
nents point to studies showing a 10 percent decline in median hourly
wage over the last 25 years; ... and a "job death" of at least 4.6 million
in the American industrial manufacturing between 1980 and 1997.'.
Over 1,400 NGOs agree in a joint statement that "in the past five years
the WTO has contributed to the concentration of wealth in the hands of
the rich few; increasing poverty for the majority of the world's popula-
tion; and unsustainable patterns of production and consumption.' 75
Unlike the employment statistics, no one seems to refute the statis-
tics that show the world's CEOs are currently experiencing record high
salaries. In 1960 the average CEO was paid 41 times more than the
average worker, and by 1997 the average CEO was paid 326 times
more. 76 The International Forum on Globalization 177 points to a recent
report that "the wealth of the world's 475 billionaires is equal to the
annual incomes of more than 50% of the people on earth;" and a report
that American CEO's are now paid 419 times more than their line
workers. 
178
VI. FREE TRADE: A TIME FOR REVIEW NOT EXPANSION.
A. Mobilization Against Globalization: Protest on the Puget
For over a year, the international civil society had been mobilizing
to make Seattle a battleground against globalization. An impressive
171. Id. at 211 (statement of Jay Mazur, President of the Union of Needletraders, In-
dustrial and Textile Employees), available in Westlaw, at 1997 WL 570309.
172. Press Pack, World Trade Organization, Seattle (Nov. 30 to Dec. 3, 1999), at 61.
173. INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT, supra note 1, at 4.
174. SAARI, supra note 14, at 128.
175. Statement from Members of International Civil Society Opposing a Millennium
Round or a New Round of Comprehensive Trade Negotiations, (Nov. 27, 1999), (hereinaf-
ter International Statement) <http://www.citizen.orgtpctrade/gattwto/Seattle%20Ministe-
rial/intl-nonewround-letter.htm> (visited Apr. 5, 2000) (includes a list of the 1448
signatories from 89 countries).
176. 1997 Executive Pay Survey, BUSINESS WEEK (Apr. 20, 1998), available at
<http://www.businessweek.com>.
177. See INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT, supra note 1.
178. Id. at 4.
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list of 1,448 NGOs representing 89 countries signed a joint declaration
against the proposed new round of comprehensive trade negotiations,
instead calling for governments to "review and rectify the deficiencies"
of the WTO.17
The citizen activists went to Seattle to protest the world's most
prominent trade regulator,18 the WTO, whose members were converg-
ing in Seattle that week to launch a new round of trade negotiations.'1
Though the week's activities commenced with a scholarly conference on
globalization hosted by the IFG,"8' massive insurgence ultimately gave
rise to pepper spray, rubber pellets, civil disobedience, and arrests."'
On November 30, 1999, over 40,000 people from all over the globe, in-
cluding "union members and students and community activists and
farmers and religious leaders and people in turtle and butterfly outfits
- came together in Seattle to assert that the global economy must be
fundamentally changed to respect people and the environment, and not
just the interests of multinational corporations."'" That same day, the
International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) closed the port
of Seattle and other ports along the west coast "demonstrating to the
corporate CEOs and their agents here in Seattle that the global econ-
omy will not run without the consent of the workers."185
This unprecedented display of vigilant protest that roused the in-
terest of people all over the world begs the question: If globalization is
truly the panacea for economic growth, job creation, and higher living
standards worldwide, why are so many people resolved to stop it?
179. International Statement, supra note 175.
180. See INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT, supra note 1, at 1 (calling the WTO the "primary
rule-making regime of the globalization process" that is "rapidly assuming the mantle of
bona fide global government for the 'free trade era"'.)
181. WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE PRESS PACK, Background: The Seattle 'Ministe-
rial', at 3 (Nov. 28, 1999) (stating that "What's special about this ministerial" is that "The
ministerial will launch major new negotiations to further liberalize international
trade...") [hereinafter WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE PRESS PACK].
182. The International Forum on Globalization (IFG) is a research and educational
institution comprised of 60 researchers, scholars, activists, and economists from 20 coun-
tries.
183. See e.g., The New Trade War, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 4-10, 1999, at 25 (noting
2,500 activists gathered for the conference but that the "Sea Town became siege town"
when "a furious rag-bag" of protestors shut down the city); REUTERS, Chaos at WTO talks
reflects public mistrust (Dec. 2 1999); CNN, Street Violence Erupts as WTO Conference Be-
gins (Nov. 30, 1999).
184. Statement by AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney on Collapse of WTO Trade
Talks (Dec. 4, 1999) <http://www.aflcio.org/publ/press1999/pr1204.htm> (visited Dec. 19,
1999).
185. Brian McWilliams, Speech for the WTO Labor Rally
<http://www.ilwu.org/wto/bmcwspeech.htm> (Nov. 30, 1999).
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B. The Significance of the Seattle Round
Throughout his presidency, President Clinton has given lip service
to labor organizations at home while surreptitiously selling out Ameri-
can workers in trade negotiations abroad. 8 6 In his 1999 State of the
Union address, President Clinton told America that: "we ought to tear
down barriers, open markets, and expand trade. But at the same time,
we must ensure that ordinary citizens in all countries actually benefit
from trade - a trade that promotes the dignity of work, the rights of
workers, and protects the environment."87
Yet the President has aggressively continued to push the status
quo free trade agenda, chartering new accords that replicate the exist-
ing failed model and refusing to change one iota of substantive obliga-
tions that protect labor at home and abroad.'88 In fact, the only thing
different is the Administration's public relations campaign, which now
186. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 149, at 2 (President Clinton sold the NAFTA to
skeptical American workers by promising to condition his support on the signing of a la-
bor side agreement, then betrayed labor when he ultimately caved in to the dissent of
Mexico by deleting from the NAALC "provisions that provided the possibility of trade
sanctions and monetary penalties for a persistent failure of a party to the NAALC to en-
force its own labor laws .. " The deletion essentially removed all teeth that the NAALC
may have had to enforce workers' right to collective bargaining and freedom of associa-
tion); see also WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION?, supra note 60, at 194 (In 1996, Clinton
pledged to prioritize labor issues in the WTO but then signed the Singapore Ministerial
Declaration which formally banished labor issues to the ILO. Then in 1998, Clinton again
promised to make labor a priority in the then upcoming Seattle Round but instead settled
for a watered-down ban on child labor that lacks enforcement.)
187. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 35
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 78, 83-4 (Jan 19, 1999) [hereinafter State of the Union Address],
available in Westlaw at 1999 WL 20505.
188. See, e.g., The People v. the WTO, THE NATION, Volume 269, Number 19, at 3 (Dec.
6, 1999) (This year the Clinton Administration is vehemently pushing for China to be ad-
mitted as a member of the WTO, and even requesting an "expedited" Congressional vote
to grant China most-favored-nation trading status, despite the notoriety of Chinese lead-
ers egregious human rights violations, including jailing union organizers and quashing
union strikes, and more recently, for threatened attacks against Taiwan. Yet the delib-
erations over China's accession to the WTO have dealt with the concessions China would
make to US industries not to human or labor rights); see also, Barshefsky Reveals US
Push to Broaden WTO Services Talks, INSIDE US TRADE (June 4, 1999) (On the issue of
the President's trade agenda over the next year, U.S. Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky said the U.S. "will push for new and improved liberalization commitments in
sectors such as finance, telecommunications, distribution, audiovisual, construction, edu-
cation, health, travel and tourism, and professional services," but made no mention of his
purported commitments to improve labor protections); WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION?,
supra note 60, at 179 (1999) ( the authors characterize Clinton's public relations cam-
paign as a "charm" strategy to combat free trade dissent and point to the recent "NAFTA-
for-Africa" legislation, completely void of substantive labor standards, as an example of
his doublespeak).
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must combat rising dissent against globalization in its current form.189
In response to the mounting dissent expressed by opponents of the Se-
attle Round, President Clinton attempted to appease protestors by tak-
ing a rhetorical high ground. He publicly challenged the other WTO
members to substantively address labor issues at the WTO meeting, yet
his only key initiatives, a ban on child labor and a WTO working group
on labor, were both narrow in focus and lacking enforcement. In the
end, WTO members would only agree on a ban of the worst forms of
child labor"a) and the possibility of a working group to study labor rights
in the WTO.19' Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen's Global Trade
Watch, testified regarding the Seattle Round:
The Administration must replace this public relations strategy with
substance ... If the President's "proposals" are to be understood as
anything other than further domestic political fodder for the Admini-
stration's attempts to continue the trade status quo, the Administra-
tion must produce tangible changes in the WTO to break what is
widely perceived in non governmental organizations (NGOs) and Con-
gressional circles as a pattern of chronic insincerity on WTO account-
ability and openness on labor and environmental issues.
192
To North American workers who valiantly fought NAFTA193 in the
early 1990's and have since struggled to block NAFTA expansion, the
WTO agenda for new expansive trade liberalization is like adding salt
189. See e.g., Testimony of Lori Wallach Regarding U.S. Preparations for the World
Trade Organization's 1999 Ministerial Meeting (May 14, 1999)
<http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/gattwto/Testimon.htm> (visited Dec. 20, 1999); and De-
mocratize the Global Economy: The tide is turning against free trade and the WTO, 40
GLOBAL EXCHANGE 7 (Fall 1999) (reporting that a recent poll shows 58 percent of
Americans agree that foreign trade has been bad for the US economy, and 81 percent of
Americans say that Congress should not accept trade agreements that give other coun-
tries the power to overturn U.S. laws).
190. See WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE PRESS PACK, supra note 181 (briefly summa-
rizing that the ban on child labor only includes the worst forms of child labor, including
"all forms of slavery, child prostitution and pornography, the use of children to traffic in
drugs and work which is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children").
191. Robert L. Borosage, The Battle in Seattle, THE NATION, Volume 269 Number 19 at
20 (Dec. 6, 1999) (While these are important steps to take, labor unions think it insuffi-
cient: "As AFL-CIO president John Sweeney has made clear, labor will applaud progress
on a working group to study labor rights at the WTO but will not end the demand for en-
forceable labor rights in trade accords."); but see Robert Kuttner, A Push For Worldwide
Labor Standards, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT ONLINE <http://www.prospect.org> (Nov. 7,
1999) (Regarding the proposed WTO working group: "U.S. trade representative Charlene
Barshevsky blurted out the truth ... In a press briefing for foreign media, Barshefsky
reassured business interests that the U.S. proposal is 'very limited.' She added, 'This is
not a negotiating group,' but merely an 'analytic' one. And '[tihe issue of sanctions is no-
where in this proposal and it is certainly not on the table."')
192. Testimony of Lori Wallach, supra note 189.
193. See NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 102.
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to an open wound. Thus, the Seattle Round was a singular opportunity
to remind trade bureaucrats and the corporate lobby that without the
workforce, the engines of globalization would shut down. In the words
of ILWU President, Brian McWilliams:
[The Seattle Round] gives us the rare opportunity to express first hand
our outrage at how workers have been treated across the planet in the
profit frenzy of globalization. It further gives us the chance to express
our resolve to fight back against a system where workers pay such a
high price for corporate greed. T9
The global insurgence and massive labor protests that erupted in
Seattle demonstrate, among other things, that the NAALC, the ILO,
and the current trading system have utterly failed to combat the ad-
verse effects of globalization on workers rights.
The Seattle demonstrations have also been a wake-up call for
Americans: " At the start of 1999, few Americans could even identify the
WTO..." and now "polls show that Americans are increasingly ill at
ease with free trade policies that boost corporate profits while cutting
wages, ending farm subsidies, and deregulating environmental and
consumer protections."'95 One of those polls found that 59 percent of
Americans surveyed thought the current free trade system hurts
Americans workers, while 35 percent thought that it helped;19 and a
second poll found "an overwhelming 83 percent" of Americans surveyed
believed that before we negotiate trade with other countries they must
"meet environmental, job security and labor condition standards."' 9'
C. Fair Trade Alternatives that Promote People, Not Profits
It is not an answer.., to say let's leave these issues of a free labor
market and environmental issues in the case of labor standards to bod-
ies like the ILO and the WTO... We have two real alternatives. Pur-
sue these issues in negotiations where they matter, or assume they
don't matter very much to our Nation and relegate them to the shad-
198
ows.
194. Brian McWilliams, President's Report: Standing Up to the WTO
<http://www.ilwu.org/wto/standinguptothewto.htm> (last modified Nov. 8, 1999).
195. John Nichols, Now What? Seattle is Just a Start, THE PROGRESSIVE 18 (January
2000)(citing a USA Today/CNN/Gallup survey).
196. Id.
197. See Survey Shows U.S. Opinion Moving Against Free Trade, CONGRESS DAILY
(Dec. 15, 1999).
198. Hearing on President's Report, supra note 118, at 16 (statement of Hon. Sander
M. Levin, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan), available at 1997 WL
570261.
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President Clinton stated in a May 1998 speech: "Globalization is
not a policy choice - it is a fact." He and other free trade champions ex-
tol "globalization" as an opportunity to be seized, not questioned. How-
ever, fair trade advocates argue that such a philosophy is deeply flawed.
Even if "globalization" is predestined, the "policy choices" are not. The
fact is: governments, trade bureaucrats, and the business lobby that
hold sway over them, make policy choices to craft trading rules that ad-
vance economic before social welfare. But there are alternative policy
choices.
For starters, 1,448 NGOs call for an immediate moratorium on fur-
ther WTO negotiations that strive to expand existing trade rules, and
during the moratorium, there must be a "comprehensive and in-depth
review and assessment of the existing agreements" conducted with full
participation of civil society, addressing issues such as marginalized
communities, democracy, labor rights and human rights. 1"
Public Citizen, a U.S. NGO whose mission is to dismantle the free
trade paradigm and erect a fair trade system in its place, further calls
for a moratorium on "WTO dispute resolution challenges to domestic
health, environmental, consumer protection, food safety, development
and human rights policies and laws... so as to provide an incentive to
renegotiate [GATT/WTO provisions] and safeguard such policies until
such changes are completed.""' In addition, Public Citizen challenges
the WTO to become more transparent by making WTO documents pub-
licly available, including those documents of negotiating groups and
dispute resolution proceedings.2 0 ' By making WTO documents available
to the public on the WTO website, and at a "publicly accessible docu-
ment room for hard copies in each WTO member country's capital," gov-
ernments are more accountable to their citizenry.2' This is not a for-
eign concept in the United States where Congressional records are
readily available for public scrutiny - as it should be in the ever-
important arena of international legislation. 2 3 Finally, Public Citizen
attacks the disparate impact of the WTO's dispute settlement proceed-
ings on poorer countries, who are typically out-spent in trade disputes,
by proposing a WTO agreement whereby a developed country plaintiff
must provide legal fees to a qualifying developing country defendantY.
According to the AFL-CIO, each trade agreement that lacks strong
enforcement mechanisms for labor protections, enshrined in the body of
199. International Society Statement, supra note 175.
200. Testimony of Lori Wallach, supra note 189.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See e.g., Freedom of Information Action, 5 U.S.C. 552 (the FOIA requires all gov-
ernment agencies to publicly release copies of government documents upon request).
204. Testimony of Lori Wallach, supra note 189.
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the text, is a missed opportunity to raise labor standards with trade lib-
eralization:
Trade preferences linked to improved labor rights and environmental
standards change the financial incentives for countries seeking market
access and increased foreign direct investment ... We must strengthen
the labor rights protections in NAFTA, so that violations of core labor
standards come under the same strict dispute settlement provisions as
205the business-related aspects of the agreement.
The AFL-CIO further contends that the WTO "must be overhauled
to guarantee workers' basic rights and to enforce and reverse the ineq-
uities in the current global economic system."2" Specifically, the AFL-
CIO challenges the U.S. government and the WTO to: incorporate en-
forceable worker rights, strengthen worker rights in domestic law at
home, enforce domestic law more rigorously, learn to enforce existing
agreements before adopting new ones, exercise the right to withdraw
from trade agreements that fail to adequately protect labor, and un-
dergo massive review and reform of existing trade agreements before
forging new agreements."7 The IFG also presents a list of "reform con-
ditions for the WTO" including in part: greater transparency and public
accountability for WTO decision-making; NGO representation in the
WTO dispute resolution process, including a right to appeal; and a
moratorium on future negotiating rounds until a public, democratic "as-
sessment round" can assess the effects of WTO to date. 208
Viable fair trade alternatives do exist. The challenge is to persuade
global policy-makers to listen, and then to depart from the status quo
by adopting a new, inclusive, and democratic system for the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
Fair trade advocates oppose NAFTA, GATT/WTO, and the ideology
of an unfettered global marketplace, not because these policies promote
trade, but because they fail to promote people. 209 This article has at-
205. Trade and Deindustrialization, supra note 166.
206. WORKERS' RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 7.
207. Trade and Deindustrialization, supra note 166.
208. INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT, supra note 1, at 42-43.
209. See e.g., Statement by Brian McWilliams, President of the International Long-
shore and Warehouse Union - AFL-CIO, An Injury to One is an Injury to All, statement
for WTO labor rally 11/30/99 ("And let us be clear. Let's not allow the free traders to paint
us as isolationist anti-traders. We are for trade. Don't ever forget - it is the labor of work-
ing people that produces all the wealth. When we say we demand fair trade policies we
mean we demand a world in which trade brings dignity and fair treatment to all workers,
with its benefits shared fairly and equally.. .") <http://www.ilwu.org/wto/bmcwspeech.
htm> (visited Apr. 6, 2000).
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tempted to show by comparison that the current trading system has es-
tablished a dangerous double standard where corporations and private
investors enjoy extraordinary profit protections far exceeding the basic
rights of workers.
Why are free trade advocates, including NAFTA and WTO negotiat-
ing countries, so adamant against incorporation of labor standards?
The WTO claims: "developing and developed nations believe the issue
has no place in the WTO framework.""21 Aside from the obvious contra-
diction that the WTO has no problem incorporating environmental is-
sues into the WTO framework,2 it is absurd to state that labor has no
place in trade - labor is commerce, and commerce is trade. It is also
deplorable to use protectionist accusations to wholly excuse labor stan-
dards from the WTO. Again, the WTO argues that some nations fear
"labour standards... are little more than a smokescreen for protection-
ism; 2 12 and at a 1996 WTO Ministerial meeting in Singapore, members
declared that they "reject the use of labour standards for protectionist
purposes."3 As long as the WTO is negotiating in the area of capital
mobility, government procurement, expropriation, and the like, than la-
bor does have a place in the WTO framework; and occupational health
and safety, livable wages, the right to organize, and to bargain collec-
tively, are not protectionist, they are essential. The omission of labor
standards in the free trade system is a policy choice, and that is a fact.
It is an unacceptable evasion of responsible governance to strategi-
cally exclude labor issues from the heart of global commerce and in-
stead "defer" the topic to a perfunctory side agreement or third party.To
import equality into the current trading system, it is essential to incor-
porate workers' rights as a core issue, equal in merit to dismantling
trade barriers, and protecting intellectual property, direct investment
and other commercial interests. Without major reform, this free trade
frenzy will continue to devour the unprotected - the global labor mar-
ket whose only shields are the unenforceable, hortatory recommenda-
tions and reports of the NAALC, and the ILO.
This reform will not come from our world leaders, who relentlessly
push free trade accords at any cost.2"Rather, the reform must come
210. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 9, at 60.
211. In 1994 the WTO adopted a working group on environmental issues, but at the
1999 Seattle Round members refused to adopt a working group to study labor issues. Ap-
parently WTO members feel the environment has more to do with trade than does labor,
or perhaps the issue of the environment is simply more benign for business than labor.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the Uruguay Round): Ministerial Decisions
and Declarations, 33 I.L.M. 136 (Dec. 15, 1993).
212. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 9, at 60.
213. Id. at 61.
214. In the U.S., each of the leading Presidential candidates unequivocally supported
free trade, and based on the policies supported and proposed by both party's leading con-
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from a movement by the people, which began in Seattle last year.
Howard Zinn2 1 5 called the demonstrations in Seattle "the weapon of
revolution":
What happened in Seattle recently... showed how
apparently powerless people - if they unite in large
numbers - can stop the machinery of government and
commerce. In an era when the power of government,
and of multinational corporations, is overwhelming, it is
instructive to get even a hint of how fragile that power
is when confronted by organized, determine citizens. 1 6
For labor organizers and workers all over the world, the mobiliza-
tion against globalization will continue until the double standard has
been dismantled, and global trade is empowering, not exploitive.
tenders, the next Administration will likely follow the current free trade status quo. See
e.g., Free trade supporters dominate the presidential campaign, <http://www.cnn.coml
ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/1/29/candidates.wto/index.html> (Nov. 29, 1999) (visited
Feb. 13, 2000); Clinton asks Congress to pass China trade agreement,
<http://www.cnn.com2000US/03/08/clinton.china.ap/index.html> (March 8, 2000)(visited
Mar. 9, 2000). The sentiment is much the same internationally. See e.g., WHAT'S AT
STAKE, supra note 3, at iii (Tony Blair stated in a recent speech: "The GATT's system of
trade rules and agreements has contributed massively to global prosperity. It is not some-
thing we should take for granted." Nelson Mandela recently stated: "We are firmly of the
belief that the existence of the GATT, and now the [WTOI, as a rules-based system, pro-
vides the foundation on which our deliberations can build in order to improve... let us
forge a partnership for development through trade and investment.").
215. Howard Zinn is the author of A People's America and Professor Emeritus at Bos-
ton University.
216. Howard Zinn, A Flash of the Possible, THE PROGRESSIVE (January 20, 2000).
4352000

